The Iraq Crisis and the Future Middle East Order

Dr. Ali A. Allawi
November 4, 2009

What is Iraq?

I ask this question because it goes to the heart of the great crisis that we are passing through.

It is not a nation, at least not in terms of the commonly understood definitions of a nation. It lacks the essential elements of nationhood; in particular Ernest Renan's acute comment that what holds a nation together is as much what its people have chosen to forget as what its people share in common. A nation's memory must be selective. That is clear, notwithstanding the ultimately doomed efforts of Arab nationalists to typecast Iraq as a uniquely Arab state, a metaphorical and actual defender of Arabism.

Neither is Iraq a nation that derives its roots in dynasties and monarchies. It is not one, such as Saudi Arabia whose borders were established by conquest, probably the only state in the Middle East that is comparable to the European nation-states that derived their origins from dynasties and kings. Iraq was ruled by the Hashemites for nearly 40 years, but they signally failed in building the dynasty into the core of a national consciousness. And neither were the Iraqis prepared to equate their 'nationhood' to the Hashemites, notwithstanding the Herculean state-building efforts of Faisal I. Jordan, an altogether more successful Hashemite effort in state-building, mainly due to the political genius of King Hussein, is still not synonymous with the dynasty.

Neither is it a nation built around the dominance of a particular class or common institution, such as the military. The Iraqi military was, until recently, the most powerful institution in the country, and was central to the official ideologies of the time. Iraq was even seen as the "Prussia" of the Arabs, with a military caste that embodied the virtues of the nation. But there were no Junkers to form the backbone of the officer class, and the idea of the army-as the-nation never took root.

Neither is it a nation that is defined by geography. The frontiers of modern Iraq are not contiguous with ancient Mesopotamia, The Lands of the Two Rivers, or al-Rafidain in Arabic. They also have mountains inconveniently attached to them, where a different ethnicity dwells; and vast desert expanses where tribesmen roam. Being a "Rafidaini" was hardly the basis of an Iraqi sense of nationhood, notwithstanding the patriotic youth marching song of the 1930's that started with the refrain, " O Sons of the Rafidain, March On for Your Country!"

Iraq as a limited geographical expression does not have the civilisational unity of say, Greater Syria, or the Nile Valley. And the sobriquet, the Fertile Crescent that has been loosely applied to identify Iraq with Greater Syria has been a weak proposition in nationhood terms.

Neither has it been a nation whose identity is built around religion. Iraq is overwhelmingly Muslim, but the idea that the Muslims of Iraq should form a nation, the way that the Muslims of British India did, is entirely meaningless, unless one is speaking of an Islamic state. That is another matter entirely. It is only very recently that the Shia Muslims of Iraq have been seen as forming the core of a Shia Arab nation. This is not only a controversial construct but it is uncertain how far Iraq can be conflated with its Shia Arab majority.

Neither is it a nation built around the almost mystical attachment to a founding text or idea-such as the US constitution, Magna Carta, Democracy or the Declaration of Human Rights. Iraqi constitutions have been threadbare and utilitarian-drawn up for specific purposes and to regulate or legitimise existing arrangements. It is unlikely that Americans would have the same relationship to their founding document if it was cobbled together in a few weeks by a set of politicians under the watchful eye of a French expeditionary force. No Jefferson, no Hamilton, no Madison, no Federalist Papers here.

And Iraq is not a nation built on the residue of Empire such as Turkey or Iran, although it was the seat of a universal empire, the Abbasid. The consciousness of a glorious past is certainly there, often misplaced, and Iraq is the birthplace of a number of ancient civilisations. But Iraqis do not appropriate the legacies of Babylon and Assyria to form a sense of nationhood the way that ancient Athens and Sparta is central to the idea of modern Greek nationhood. Archaeology is not the raw material of nationhood.

There are only a few countries in the world only the same complex patrimony as modern Iraq. Usually one loyalty or identity prevails and forms the backbone of the national idea, but Iraq has been different. It is a fragmented nation only because the attempt to impose a singular identity has failed. The question becomes: Can one build a sense of nationhood out of the parts-a nation of disparate parts?

I believe you can.

But only if you acknowledge that the dissimilar parts are real with a real connection to larger wholes. Not in the sense of a country composed of other's bits and pieces that exist because of a geographic quirk or because of the impossibility of abolishing its geopolitical status.

Parts of nations, religions, sects, cultures and tribes live in Iraq. But Iraq is not a multi-cultural or multi-ethnic society in the modern pluralist sense. It has not inherited the institutionalised multi-ethnicity of the Ottoman millet system, nor the now-problematic multi-culturalism brought on by immigrants into essentially western countries. Its potential for accommodation may have existed socially in the past, a product of the need to adjust and co-exist over centuries. But this natural accommodation has been severely disrupted over the past decades-both during the Baathist dictatorship and in the post-invasion and occupation period.

Emerging from centuries when it was a part of someone else's empire, the fragments of peoples and cultures that were found in Iraq were constituted as a state on no better grounds than the grubby deal struck in 1917 by two civil servants from Whitehall and Paris-Mr Sykes and M. Picot . The exact lines of this state were later refined in the Cairo Conference of 1921 and added to by the addition of the former Ottoman province of Mosul in 1926. Not so much a contrived or invented nation, as some had claimed; but neither was it a "natural" nation in the way that Egypt was for example. It was up to the state to define the contours of this nation. And the First Iraqi State, which started in 1921 and had its ignominious end in 2003 made a hash of it.

How the First Iraqi State mismanaged the affairs of the country has been the grist for the historians' mill. I will not dwell too much on it. All three phases of this state-the monarchical, Republican and finally the Baathist dictatorship-were unable to create the fundamentals of equitable citizenship or a representative and responsive government, let alone nationhood. I firmly believe though that the First Iraqi State could have transcended its initial problems under wiser and more far-sighted leadership. But it lost in Faisal I's early death the possibility of moulding a state that was not beholden to narrow factional groups. Later the Iraqi state was buffeted by the political hurricanes that affected the Middle East from the 1940's onwards. The First Iraqi State had several opportunities for breaking free from its legacy. The late monarchical period of the 1950's that coincided with a massive expansion of oil wealth, was one such opportunity. It ended in the bloody denouement of the 1958 coup that put an end to the monarchy. It had another chance during the premiership of the liberal Abd el-Rahman al-Bazzaz in the mid 1960's. That ended with the death of President Aref in a helicopter crash in 1965 and the reassertion of direct military control. These 'liberal' moments came and went. They were not much mourned at the time but in retrospect they could have diverted the path of the First Iraqi State from dictatorship and war and finally its collapse.

By invading and occupying Iraq, the US became the midwife for the birth of the Second Iraqi State. However, The Occupation authorities had dismantled the key props of the old state even before any of the outlines of the Second State were being delineated. With the old rules declared null and void, and the new rules still unwritten, the Iraqi governmental machinery spun out of control. Parts imploded; parts ceased to function; parts became hopelessly degraded and corrupted. The Second Iraqi State was also challenged not only by the stalwarts of the former regime, by radical jihadis who had declared war on the US, but also the neighbouring countries. Each of them-with the exception of Kuwait-felt directly threatened by the unprecedented changes taking place in Iraq-and each for their own reasons. The entire balance of power in the Middle East was severely shaken.

I have tried to give a comprehensive treatment for the occupation of Iraq and its aftermath in my book, so I will not go over its grounds. But I now believe that the period that was covered in the book and that ended sometime in 2007 was in fact the end of the first phase of the Iraq crisis.

What do I mean by that?

The first phase of the post-2003 period dealt with the fundamental outlines of the new state in Iraq. While the First Iraqi State was built on the notion of a centralised state; a strong military; a dominant Sunni Arab class; an authoritarian political culture; and an affirmation of Iraq's Arab identity, the Second Iraqi State reversed or changed almost all these priorities. The crisis of the 2003-2007 periods was in fact the groping towards the main features of the new Iraq and the violent resistance to that by a variety of groups that sought to reverse these changes and revert either to the status quo ante or to an altogether different structure and purpose for the Iraqi state. The political process that was launched by the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, revolved around these fundamental issues, even though the players did not consciously understand it in these terms.

The US sought to frame the debate on the new Iraq in terms of democracy, freedoms and rights, and the building of the institutions of a modern democratic state. It, and a few Iraqi liberals, thought that the creation of the scaffolding of democracy and the rule of law would push Iraq's tensions and conflicts aside-that they will be reconciled through a new calculus of elections, constitutions and human rights.

While all these goals were enshrined in the new constitution of Iraq, they also helped to shroud and obscure the more serious power struggle going on underneath the surface. It was at this level that the elemental fight in Iraq was taking place-not at the level of milestones, benchmarks and conferences. Were the Shia as a community able to equate their demographic majority with the right to determine and dominate the new state structures, especially the key ministries and security and military apparatuses? Were the Kurds able to solidify their autonomous status into something that would be more substantive either in the form of a con-federal Iraq or perhaps even the beginnings of a new Kurdish state? Will the Sunni Arabs acquiesce to their loss of power, even though it was at the hands of a foreign invader? Was the Iraqi state to lose its centralised status and become a federal or even con-federal state? Will Iraq opt out of Arab causes, especially the Arab Israeli conflict? Will Iraq abandon its long-term hostility to Iran? Will the religious establishment of the Shia be given a formal commanding or guiding role in the new Iraq? Will the US demand and receive a special acknowledgement and status for its role in Iraq? These were issues that were all jumbled up with the collapse of the state, the incredible levels of violence prevailing and the fight against the insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Until the attack on the Samarra shrines in February 2006, the undeclared subterranean war-between the US and the insurgents and between the Al-Qaeda and the Shia civilian population-had not yet spilled over into the general population as a whole. After February 2006, the landscape utterly changed. I do not hesitate to say that Iraq went through a vicious civil war between February 2006 and the summer of 2007. This war pitted the insurgents, al-Qaeda, elements of the Sunni Arab parties in government against the militias of the Mahdi Army, the Badr Brigades and with logistical and manpower support from the units of the Iraqi army and security forces. It was not two organised sides fighting it out as is conventional in the majority of civil wars. It was local groups fighting at a local level, using all types of tactics; random killings, suicide bombings, assassinations; expulsions; and terrorising of innocents and families. The formal government watched and made futile pronouncements; but the Shia parties were fully involved in the war's preparation and execution. It did not take place ex-nihilo. The groundwork for the impending civil war was well under way during 2005. The Mahdi Army did most of the dirty work. Others provided them with weapons, money and intelligence. In the end, and I hate to say this, the civil war ended with a clear winner. The Shia dominated Baghdad; were on the verge of sweeping outside of the city into the western reaches of Baghdad; and appeared unstoppable were it not for the deployment of the MNF forces to put a stop to this rout. Tens of thousands of people were killed in this war-mostly Sunni Arabs.

Millions were displaced, ethnically cleansed or went into exile. Entire neighbourhoods switched into an ethnic monochrome.

What was this civil war about?

Well, not only about looting, theft, power hungry militia commanders and sadistic murders and killings. Ultimately, it was about the features of thee new Iraq, especially in terms of the permanence of the switch in control from the previous Sunni Arab domination to the new Shia ascendancy. On another level it was to do with the institutional, legal and political make-up of post-invasion Iraq-what I have called the Second Iraqi State. The civil war ended when the insurgents-the bulwark of the former regime such as army and security officers; Baath party operatives and tribal leaders-recognised that they could not win this war for two fundamental reasons. The first was the Shia demographic majority; the second was the lock that the Shia parties had on the new Iraqi state-its resources and its nascent security organisations. Another potent consideration in my estimate is that the massive exodus of Sunni Arabs outside of Iraq drastically shrunk the Sunni presence in Iraq's main conurbation of Baghdad. A long-term insurgency cannot be sustained with a reducing population base. This pushed the insurgents-not al-Qaeda of course-to open discussions with the Americans. They mainly switched their allegiances-not to the Government, I stress, but to the Americans, selling themselves as the antidote to al-Qaeda and a bulwark against Iranian infiltration of Iraq. This is the genesis of the so-called "Awakening Councils-The Sahwat." Al-Qaeda's brutalities and strategic miscalculations in their indiscriminate terror campaign may have pushed them over the edge. But the main drive was a cold calculation of their interests and in their recognition that the new Iraqi order was not going to be bombed out of existence. They will have to deal with this new reality.

I also believe that the two states that have the most bearing on the Iraq crisis, namely the US and Iran were involved in the civil war-either by omission or by commission. Iran assuredly played an advisory and support role to the Shia militias in the run-up to the civil war and during the fighting itself. The US did not move its forces in any way to stem the violence or to patrol threatened neighbourhoods, until the Shia sweep was about to depopulate Baghdad of its Sunnis. The Arab countries, upon whom the insurgents had relied for support, did not extend any extra help to the beleaguered Sunni population of Iraq. Al-Qaeda's declared strategy of fomenting civil war in Iraq as a prelude to a regional war between the Sunnis and the Shia failed miserably. The Arabs were too afraid of the consequences of an open backing of one side over the other, and the fear of instability spilling into their own countries. They were also unsure of the American response. So they did what they normally do when uncomfortable with the options-Nothing.

The end of Iraq's civil war did not resolve a host of other issues that have been left festering, but it did end the first phase of the post-invasion crisis. Monumental and irreversible changes had taken place. They were positive or negative depending on the viewer's perspective. But a host of serious problems and issues remained. These are the components of the second phase, the present phase, of the birth pangs of the Second Iraqi State.

Kurdish regional demands, the status of Kirkuk, the nature of Iraqi federalism, provincial and regional powers, the development of the oil industry, revenue-sharing, and constitutional amendments-these are all issues that are still to be resolved. But the composition of the parliamentary blocs is nearly all based on sectarian and ethnic considerations and these in turn govern their responses. The current governing coalition is based on the bedrock of an alliance between the Kurdish parties and the Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI), a party led by Abd el-Aziz al-Hakim. But this has been insufficient to provide direction and leadership to the country, especially when it is has been challenged over a number of issues over which agreement is lacking. For example, acceding to Kurdish demands for an early referendum on Kirkuk, or their right to negotiate their own oil contracts is not at all popular amongst Arab Iraqis. The Kurds would normally expect the support of the Shia for their position, but the Shia politicians are split between federalists and centralists, now that the prospects for exercising undivided power in Baghdad beckon.

The possibility of paralysis always exists, so that these issues could fester for a long while without a national consensus on their treatment. The governing alliance is also buffeted by serious internal power struggles. Inside the Shia bloc, there is continuous tension between and within the main groups, frequently spilling over into violence and open street warfare. There is a power struggle going on for control over the overwhelmingly Shia southern provinces, including control over the provincial assemblies and governments, smuggling, extortion and protection rackets and physical control over the oil industry. The Sunni Arabs in government, especially the Islamic Party of the Vice President al-Hashemi, is being openly challenged by the Awakening Councils, who are seeking to replace the party as the Sunni component of the government. The Kurdish leadership itself is facing growing disenchantment inside Kurdistan because of authoritarian practices, marginalisation of other political groups, and a regional economy dominated by cronyism and special interests.

The day-to-day administration of Iraq has been appalling. The bureaucracy has been entirely dysfunctional, riven by stifling procedures, incompetence, backward systems, and opaque practices. There are incredible levels of corruption that have permeated the highest echelons of the government-including cabinet ministers, provincial governors and regional government. I believe that corruption in Iraq is a national security issue and could destroy the chances of successful reconstruction of the country.

I do not believe however that these issues will either lead to the implosion of the country or another bout of all-out civil war. Al-Qaeda has not gone away, but its influence is being eroded every passing day. It has moved its locus of activity elsewhere-probably to Pakistan. The insurgents, with US blessing, have rebranded themselves and are now, in the absurd construct of the pr boys, "Concerned Local Citizens". A good many of them were killers and murderers a few months ago! The Mahdi Army is undergoing revamping by Muqtada al-Sadr, who will probably emerge as a main challenger to the status quo in the upcoming elections. The institutions of the new order are entrenching themselves, and a new political culture that revolves around them is emerging. They may have a democratic provenance but they are not afforded the respect that they would normally enjoy in longer established democracies. We have anti-corruption commissions, which are in turn accused of corrupt practices; we have electoral commissions that are openly partisan; we have courts where judges are regularly bought off; we have a parliament that descends into histrionics, abuse and frequent mass absences; we have political parties that are no more than vehicles for personal rule and power; we have parliamentarians and high state officials who cheat and lie about their qualifications and background; ministers who were on the dole for decades and are now hobnobbing with the high and mighty of the world. This is the political class that has inherited power and clings to it as for dear life. The whole affair is kept alive by two factors; the price of oil and the incredibly costly and persistent exertions of the US to secure the country, a situation partly brought on by the US's own gross miscalculations.

Iraq is now awash with cash from $90 oil. The Central bank's reserves stand at nearly $25 billion; the Ministry of Finance consistently generates a cash surplus because of unplanned oil revenue increases; the state budget is used to employ people in the hundreds of thousands; idiotic errors in planning and managing the economy are rectified by smothering them with cash; the entire population benefits from the world's most generous and comprehensive free food plan; pensions are at a most generous level for all state employees. The Oil Curse has hit Iraq in a big way; as has the Dutch Disease that has pushed the Iraqi dinar upwards of 15% over the dollar. But as oil giveth so it can take away. A drop in the oil price to say $50, an unlikely but not impossible event, will have a catastrophic effect on the Iraqi economy and will destroy the ability of the government to use the budget to bury its incompetence, corruption and fund both the security forces and the universal subsidies.

The US presence is an altogether different matter. The MNF has kept the Iraqi government alive and is the all-essential backbone to the actions against al-Qaeda. But it is unclear what effects its departure from the scene will have. It is implausible that the Awakening Councils will reconstitute themselves as an insurgency once again. This time the Sunni Arab population will be far more vulnerable than during the dire days of 2006-2007. The security forces will be stripped of their present partly non-sectarian form, and will become completely identified with the Shia parties. With such odds a new insurgency will only lead to further hardships for the Sunni Arab population. At the same time, the reduction of US forces may force the government towards assuming greater responsibility for the security of the country and therefore push it towards a distribution of power that would improve the position of the Sunni Arab community. The only real beneficiaries at present of the large US presence are the Awakening Councils, who cling to the US as a counterweight to the Shiadominated state; and to a lesser extent and reducing extent the governing coalition in Baghdad, which will have to divert more resources and effort to securing the country.

The regional order in the Middle East has been turned upside down by the events of the past five years. The Second Iraqi State must strive to find ways to accommodate the legitimate concerns of its neighbours while pushing and cajoling them into accepting new arrangements that will strengthen the regions' economies and societies, protect the rights of its citizens and reduce the radicalisation and Talibanisation of its youth. One of the unfortunate and dangerous side effects of the Iraq crisis has been the exacerbation of sectarian differences between Shias and Sunnis throughout the Muslim World. In Lebanon it is becoming the defining issue of its politics. The cost of a Shia ascendancy in Iraq is already the rekindling of anti-Shia rhetoric in a remarkably similar rerun to the pattern that accompanied the Saudi-led campaign to contain the Iranian revolution in the 1980s. The effect of that was the rise of the jihadi culture that was the harbinger of mass terrorism and suicide bombings.

There are huge risks and opportunities in the path that Iraq chooses or is compelled to follow over the next decade. The current impasse can continue into the future, extending the transitional period-or the second phase-of the Iraq crisis well into the next decade. The end result may very well be a semi-democracy that has authoritarian features dominated by a clique of political families, and sustained by oil revenues. The great losers in this exercise would be the Iraqi people, who will pay in terms of lost opportunities and high costs, for the learning curve of the new political class. A similar path was trodden by a number of post Soviet countries where the transition periods were long and tumultuous. But Angola or Nigeria might be a more pertinent example for Iraq: a rich but corrupt country; immense wealth for the few who dominate the state; with the rest of the population living in various stages of disadvantage and misery. An undemocratic parlour game between politicians and their business allies, veiled by the outer forms of a democracy.

The possibility of change though is not altogether absent. A better future for Iraq can still be salvaged out of this unholy mess. But a number of preconditions have to be met. Firstly, a serious attempt must be made to create or rally a new political centre force in Iraq in readiness for the general elections of 2009. There is no doubt that there is huge resentment against the incompetence and corruption of the government. There is also a sense that sectarian politics have had their day, and should not govern the future pattern of Iraqi political life; unless of course Iraq is divided into super ethnic or sectarian regions. But these are insufficient to engineer a turnaround in Iraq's fortunes. There has to be a governing vision for the country, partly based on the need to articulate a nationhood for its disparate parts and partly on the promise of better governance. This vision and promise have to contend with the rootedness of identity politics, and the fierce resistance of the sectarian, ethnic and ideological parties to any change of the terms of politics. Any new movement has to also contend with the fact that the governing alliance s are better funded-frequently through theft of state assets or protection and extortion rackets-and are better protected, with their armed wings, militia s and armies.

The second precondition requires the articulation of a plan that will reconcile the region with the irreversible changes that have taken place in Iraq and which will also produce an economic and political vision for the region as a whole which Iraq will champion. Iraq cannot afford to be treated with indifference or put into quarantine, as what appears to be happening with nearly all the Arab states of the Middle East. Iraq should take a lead in reducing regional tensions and bringing about greater regional integration. It should actively champion the formation of supra-national institutions for the area to enhance economic integration and harmonisation. That may include a regional development body which would help establish and fund common energy and infrastructure policies. Lastly, an indispensable end outcome is a regional security pact that would group the countries of the Arab Middle East with Iran and Turkey, at first in some form of anti-terrorism pact, but later a broader framework for discussing and resolving major security issues that impinge on the area as a whole. That would also provide the forum for combating the spread of virulent ideologies and sectarian hatreds and provide the basis for peacefully containing and resolving the alarm that some countries feel from the apparent expansion of Iranian influence in the area.

Iraq must embrace its unique diversity but not in terms of some vague call for pluralism and multi-ethnicity. Rather, the "nationhood of disparate parts" of Iraq should be seen as the gateway to the broader region. The Shia Arabs of Iraq should act as the interlocutors between Iran and the Arab World, fearful as it is of an Iranian expansion into the area. The Sunnis in Iraq should also reach out to the broader Sunni Arab world and reduce their anxieties about a Shia majority in Iraq as somehow acting as a cat's paw for Iran. Both the Shias and Sunnis in Iraq should develop the basis of an Islamic doctrine of co-existence and mutual respect which the Iraq state and civil society would propagate as a matter of policy internally and throughout the Islamic world. The Kurds in Iraq should use their freedoms and rights as a model for other Kurdish communities and populations in Turkey, Iran and Syria. By reaffirming their commitment to the idea of Iraq as a nation of disparate parts, they can dispel the fear that Turkey in particular has about the long-term objectives of the Kurds of Iraq.

The third precondition requires the articulation of an Iraqi vision for its long-term relationship with the US. This will be based on a critical examination of the past and the formulation of arrangements that will preserve and build on the immense benefits that can accrue to Iraq and the US in a confident and equitable relationship. Oil, energy policy, American military bases, US support for Iraq's reconstruction and institutional reform, anti-terrorism coordination, the list is endless.

Iraqis have to know also what the US wants from Iraq. Will there be a national consensus on Iraq after the elections; or will the entire Iraq episode be erased out of the US's memory as George Bush's folly? By the time the present level; of the US's commitment is over, the US would have spent probably a trillion dollars on this expedition-one trillion dollars! I can understand Americans demanding to walk away from a conflict in "a far away country about a people of whom we know little," to paraphrase Neville Chamberlain. But I don't think this will happen, no matter who comes to power next year. The US's engagement with Iraq must be recast though after the anomalous and astonishing interlude of the Bush years; in terms of your own foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and how you propose to deal with Iran, nuclear proliferation, Palestine and Israel, al-Qaeda and the difference between radical Islam and the terrorists who use Islam.

Finally, I would like to conclude by raising another imponderable.

There is nothing sacrosanct or inevitable about the survival of the Second Iraq State. It might also disintegrate-not because of the wars of aggression that brought on the demise of the First Iraqi State. But because it has lost relevance or meaning to some or most of its inhabitants. On a happier note, its institutions may also dissolve into a benign confederation of Middle Eastern states.

Britain midwifed the First Iraqi State; the US destroyed it-or delivered the coup de grace. In between Iraqis more or less ran it. The US brought about the Second Iraqi State. Iraqis are now, more or less running it, watched by an anxious US. What we do now-Iraqis and Americans-will determine whether this state will survive and meet the minimal expectations of its people. Iraqis are owners and custodians over Iraq. But as Lincoln said, "A house divided against itself cannot stand." The police are usually called in when the occupants of such a house attack their neighbours. Sometimes the police also show up when the occupants attack each other. Iraqis must understand that this time around, the house may very well fall down on their heads if they don't find a way of living together-and enjoying being together.

Without the Policeman!

First Published on: February 20, 2008